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Abstract
The representation of women in top corporate oﬃcer positions is steadily increasing.
However, little is known about the impact this will have. A large literature documents that
women are diﬀerent from men in their choices and in their preferences, but most of this
literature relies on samples of college students or workers at lower levels in the corporate
hierarchy. If women must be like men to break the glass ceiling, we might expect gender
diﬀerences to disappear among top executives. In contrast, using a large survey of all di-
rectors of publicly-traded corporations in Sweden, we show that female and male directors
diﬀer systematically in their core values and risk attitudes. While certain population gender
diﬀerences disappear at the director level, others do not. Consistent with the ﬁndings for
the Swedish population, female directors are more benevolent and universally concerned,
but less power-oriented than men. However, they are less traditional and security-oriented
than their male counterparts. Furthermore, female directors are slightly more risk-loving
than male directors. This suggests that having a women on the board need not lead to more
risk-averse decision-making.
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In the light of recent corporate scandals and the ongoing ﬁnancial crisis, the question has been
raised whether things would be diﬀerent if more women ran corporate America (Huﬃngton, 2003).
One beneﬁt of diversity is that people with diﬀerent backgrounds may have diﬀerent viewpoints.
As Kirk and Gwin (2009) argue, these may be particularly valuable in diﬃcult economic times.
Kristof (2009) points out that ﬁnancial ﬁrms are particularly male-dominated and suggests that
this may have contributed to the recent poor performance of banks. Harriet Harman, UK Labour
party’s number 2, has gone so far as to blame the ﬁnancial crisis on the male domination in banks
(Morris, 2009). Consistent with the arguments that ﬁrms with more gender-diverse boards can
perform better is new evidence in Adams and Ferreira (2008) that more gender diverse boards
appear to be tougher monitors. For example, female directors have better attendance behavior at
board meetings and tend to sit on more monitoring-related committees than male directors.
An important question for understanding the eﬀect of increased female participation in corpo-
rate leadership is whether such diﬀerences in behavior are due to fundamental diﬀerences between
men and women or due to the fact that women are in the minority. For example, female directors
may behave diﬀerently because they are less connected to old-boys’ networks and thus have more
independence of thought. However, as their representation increases, they may build their own
networks and/or get better integrated into existing networks and act less independently. On the
other hand, if women and men are intrinsically diﬀerent, then the presence of women may have
long-term eﬀects on corporate decision-making.
Much of the research on gender points to fundamental diﬀerences between men and women
(see Marini, 1990; Croson & Gneezy, 2008). For example, gender gaps have been documented for
risk attitudes (Eckel & Grossman, 2008; Sapienza, Zingales & Maestripieri, 2009), desired exposure
to competition (Niederle & Vesterlund, 2007), and altruistic behavior (Andreoni & Vesterlund,
22001). The studies suggest that women are generally more risk averse, less keen on being exposed
to competition, and more altruistic when altruism is expensive. In the ﬁeld of psychology, survey
evidence documents gender diﬀerences in core values (see Schwartz & Rubel, 2005) that are robust
across cultures.
However, most of these studies focus on students, workers or the general population, thus it
is unclear whether we should expect women at the top of the corporate ladder to be any diﬀerent
from men. In fact, there are several reasons why we might expect gender diﬀerences to vanish
beyond the glass ceiling. First, Niederle, Segal & Vesterlund (2008) show that women often try
to avoid competitive environments. Thus, it is possible that the women who do pursue leadership
positions are very similar to men. Second, Branson (2006) presents evidence from court cases
against gender discrimination in which women were denied promotion because they acted too
“feminine”. Therefore, only women who think like men may be promoted by their male colleagues.
Third, women in a predominantly male environment may adapt their behavior so that gender
diﬀerences disappear.
Empirical evidence on gender diﬀerences at the executive level is scant partly because so few
women are represented in corporate leadership positions. In the US, women held 14.8% of Fortune
500 board seats in 2007 (Catalyst, 2007). The percentage of female directors in Australia, Canada,
Japan, and Europe is estimated to be 8.7%, 10.6%, 0.4% and 8%, respectively (Equal Opportunity
for Women in the Workplace Agency (EOWA), 2006; European Professional Women’s Network
(EPWN), 2004). In this paper, we examine gender diﬀerences at the executive level using data
on board members in Sweden. In 2005, women held 17.34% of board seats in listed Swedish
companies.1 Thus, Swedish data lends itself particulary well to a study of gender diﬀerences at the
executive level.
1In general, female representation in the boardroom is much higher in Nordic countries than in other
countries. The most extreme promotion of gender diversity occurs in Norway, where since January 2008 all
listed companies must abide by a 40% gender quota for female directors or face dissolution.
3The main question we ask is: how similar are female executives to male executives? There
are many metrics one could use to compare women and men. Since it is impractical to conduct
experiments at the executive level, we use survey data. We focus on examining survey measures
of directors’ values as deﬁned by Schwartz (1992). The Schwartz value survey is among the most
advanced that psychologists use, has been replicated in many countries and produces consistent and
reliable results. It is particularly useful for our purposes for several reasons. First, values summarize
a wide range of potential characteristics. As Schwartz (1992) discusses, values transcend particular
situations and actions and are driving forces in life. Schwartz (1992) identiﬁes 10 basic human values
that are recognized by all cultures and that leaves out no major value that is meaningful across
societies (Schwartz & Rubel, 2005). Second, researchers have shown that these values predict a
variety of actions that the experimental literature argues can explain diﬀerences in outcomes across
the sexes, for example, voting behavior or altruistic behavior in experiments (see e.g. Andreoni
& Vesterlund, 2001). Third, the European Social Survey uses the Schwartz value survey to study
values in the general population in various countries, including Sweden. Thus, we are able to
compare values of directors to those in the general population. This enables to examine which
gender diﬀerences at the population level persist in the boardroom and which do not.
We surveyed the universe of resident directors and CEOs (1,796 individuals) of publicly-traded
ﬁrms in Sweden in 2005. In addition to the relatively high representation of women among di-
rectors, conducting such a survey in Sweden has other advantages. For example, unlike in many
other countries, it is straightforward to identify and obtain characteristics of the entire population
of directors of publicly-traded corporations. Surveying the population of directors reduces sample
selection bias. Having information about characteristics of the population enables us to use Heck-
man selection techniques to address the possibility of nonresponse bias. Second, gender equality is
high in Sweden. This suggests that stereotyping or gender biases should be smaller than in other
countries and increases conﬁdence that any gender eﬀects we ﬁnd are not driven by these biases.
4Finally, Swedish board structure has features that closely resemble those of boards in sole board
countries as in the US and UK, but it also shares features with dual board structures as in Germany,
for example, the presence of worker representatives on the board. Employees in companies with
more than 25 employees have the right to appoint two directors while employees in companies with
more than 1000 employees are allowed to appoint up to 3 directors (as long as employee representa-
tives do not constitute a majority on the board). While we focus on the non worker-representatives
directors in our analysis, we can use the worker representatives as a robustness check. We take it as
re-assuring evidence that our survey measures of values are meaningful since worker representatives
diﬀer in reported values from the other directors along expected dimensions.
Our survey instrument consisted of Schwartz’s 40 question Portrait Value Questionnaire (PVQ),
which we augmented with a question designed to measure risk aversion. We received responses
from 628 individuals (a response rate of 36.6% from directors and 29.7% percent from CEOs)
representing all but 36 (12.59%) of all publicly-traded ﬁrms in 2005. The responses indicate that
even at the top, women and men are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent in terms of values and risk attitudes.
Male directors care more about achievement and power than female directors, and less about
universalism and benevolence. This is consistent with prior literature that has found that across
cultures men consistently attribute more importance to self-enhancement values (achievement and
power) (e.g. Schwartz and Rubel, 2005), whereas women emphasize self-transcendence values
(universalism and benevolence). However, in contrast to the “typical” gender gaps in the Swedish
population and broad patterns documented for other cultures, female directors are less security
oriented, less traditional and care more about stimulation than male directors. Surprisingly, but
in line with the ﬁnding that women in the boardroom care less about security than men, female
directors are also slightly more risk-loving than their male colleagues.
To our knowledge, our paper is the ﬁrst to examine gender gaps at the executive level. We believe
the results are interesting for several reasons. First, even though there is plenty of speculation about
5whether increasing gender diversity in management makes a diﬀerence, causal evidence is hard to
obtain due to endogeneity problems (see, however, Adams and Ferreira, 2008). We document
that even at the director level, there are fundamental diﬀerences between women and men. This
suggests that changes in diversity can have causal eﬀects on corporate outcomes. For example, ﬁrms
with more female directors might consistently make decisions that are more stakeholder-oriented,
because female directors emphasize self-transcendence values more.2 On the other hand, contrary
to conventional wisdom, increasing gender diversity need not result in more risk-averse decision
making.
Second, understanding whether women in leadership positions are diﬀerent from “typical”
women in the population may help reduce statistical discrimination. Anecdotal evidence suggests
that ﬁrms may be reluctant to appoint women to leadership positions because they believe they are
too risk-averse or conservative. Our evidence suggests that women in leadership positions do not
satisfy these gender stereotypes. While prospective female candidates for leadership positions are
not equivalent to women who already occupy leadership roles, our results are at least suggestive
that such candidates may have diﬀerent attributes than the population average.
Our results are also interesting to understand potential implications of recent aﬃrmative action
policies concerning gender quotas at the director level. In Norway, since 2008 all shareholder-owned
companies are by law required to have at least 40% women in the boards. In Spain, the government
passed guidelines to encourage companies to increase the share of female directors with the goal of
40% female representation by 2015 (see Proyecto de Codigo Uniﬁcado de Recomendaciones de Buen
Gobierno de Sociedades Cotizadas). The larger the gender quota, the more likely it is that women
will be chosen as directors who are similar to the population average. As we show, these women
may have substantially diﬀerent attributes than women who obtained their director position in the
2Adams, Licht and Sagiv (2008) show that directors with higher benevolence/universalism values are
more likely to side with stakeholders if their interests conﬂict with those of shareholders.
6competitive market for directors. Understanding these diﬀerences may help explain the impact of
these gender quotas on corporate outcomes.
The remainder of the article is structured as follows. Section 2 relates our paper to the literature.
Section 3 gives some background information on Swedish boards and the data we use. Section
4 presents the main analysis of gender diﬀerences in the boardroom. Section 5 highlights the
diﬀerences between the directors and the comparable Swedish population, and Section 6 concludes.
2 Relation to the Literature
This paper lies at the intersection of the gender and management literature, and therefore relates
directly to both strands of the literature. As for existing research on gender, our results compare
most directly with the experimental literature on gender diﬀerences in competition.
Our starting point is the observation that in many countries the share of women in competitive
high-ranking positions is low. While discrimination based on gender is one possible explanation
for this fact, experimental results by Gneezy, Niederle & Rustichini (2003), Niederle & Vester-
lund (2007) and Niederle, Segal & Vesterlund (2008) point to other relevant factors: ﬁrst of all,
women perform less well in competitive environments, even if they are able to perform similarly
in non-competitive environments (Gneezy, Niederle & Rustichini, 2003).3 Furthermore, Niederle &
Vesterlund (2007) and Niederle, Segal & Vesterlund (2008) show that conditional on ability, women
choose competitive tournaments much less than men, and therefore shy away from competition.
Compared to the payoﬀ-maximizing strategies, too many low ability men enter the tournaments,
and too few high ability women.
3The experiments were conducted with students of engineering in Haifa, Israel. In each group (three men,
three women), students had to solve computerized mazes. In the benchmark treatment, payoﬀs depended
solely on the individual’s own performance: no gender diﬀerences in performance were found. In the com-
petitive treatment, only the winner got a prize. Here, men outperform women. While womens’ payoﬀ was
not aﬀected, mens’ payoﬀs substantially increased.
7These experimental studies suggest that women typically dislike competitive environments. This
raises the question about the type of women who aspire to competitive management positions. Are
they any diﬀerent from men? Our study examines this issue and answers yes.
With this result, we contribute to the ongoing debate about the potential impact of gender
diversity on organizational outcomes. A large body of literature argues that gender diversity can
have a signiﬁcant impact on organizational outcomes (see, e.g. the survey by Milliken and Martins,
1996). However, relatively few studies examine gender diversity in management, partly because of
the low representation of women in management. Furthermore, it is often not clear whether the
eﬀect of gender diversity can be attributed to fundamental diﬀerences between women and men or
to other factors that happen to be correlated with gender diversity. For example, in the context
of directors gender diversity could have an impact, not because female directors are diﬀerent from
men, but because the population of female directors happens to diﬀer from the population of male
directors in terms of age, tenure or other characteristics that are potentially uncorrelated with
gender preferences. By establishing that male and female directors appear to diﬀer systematically
in their underlying beliefs, their values, our results suggest that fundamental diﬀerences between
female and male directors may be driving the eﬀects of gender diversity on boards on organizational
outcomes.
Finally, we add to a small but growing strand of literature that analyzes how culture, values and
attitudes aﬀect economic outcomes (see Guiso, Sapienza & Zingales, 2006 for an overview). Previous
studies have documented eﬀects of culture on labor force participation and fertility (Fernandez,
2007a; Fernandez, 2007b), economic exchange (Guiso, Sapienza & Zingales, 2009), or per capita
growth of regions (Tabellini, 2008). In the context of corporations, we analyze the role of values
and the likely consequences they have on corporate decisions.
83 Data
3.1 The Survey
We used MM Partner, a database containing names of board members of all public and private
ﬁrms in Sweden to identify the set of directors, CEOs and Vice CEOs (the equivalent of Presidents
in a US ﬁrm) of all publicly-traded ﬁrms in Sweden in 2005. In 2005, there were 288 publicly-traded
ﬁrms listed on the OMX (A& O list) and the NGM (Nordic Growth Market). Including Vice CEOs,
these ﬁrms have 468 CEOs and 1,372 resident board members. We surveyed all CEOs and board
members.
To increase the response rate, the survey was mailed to the home addresses of each individual.
In addition, we used the help of Statistics Sweden to guarantee that the responses were anonymous.
Recipients of the survey mailed their responses to Statistics Sweden, which matched the responses
to data on personal characteristics on the basis of personal identifying numbers, but then removed
all personal identifying information.
The ﬁrst survey was sent out on July 14, 2006. We followed it up with two reminders. The last
survey response was received on November 11, 2006.4 In total, we received 502 responses (36.6%)
from board members and 126 responses (29.7%) from CEOs.5 Most respondents ﬁlled out the
entire survey. Thus, we have complete surveys for 485 board members and all CEOs. Although the
response rate is good compared to other surveys of top management teams,6 an obvious concern in
this context is that responses may be biased because female directors diﬀer systematically in their
tendency to respond. We address this concern by applying Heckman selection models to individual
director responses in Section 4.
4Because the survey respondents mailed their surveys to Statistics Sweden, we were unable to obtain the
exact dates of all responses.
532 of the CEO respondents were Vice CEOs, the rest were CEOs.
6For example, Simons, Pelled and Smith (1999) report a response rate of 6%.
9From MM Partner, we obtain information on director age, tenure on the board and the identities
of worker representatives for the entire population of directors and CEOs. From Osiris, we obtain
the 2005 Financial Times industry classiﬁcation for the sample ﬁrms. From Statistics Sweden
we obtain information on the number of children and the marital status of each director. From
the European Social Survey (ESS) we obtain information on values of individuals in the Swedish
population, as we describe in more detail in Section 5.
3.2 Director Values
To measure director and CEO values, we used Schwartz’s 40 question Portrait Value Questionnaire
(PVQ), which we augmented with a question designed to measure risk aversion. To ensure that
the Swedish questions reﬂected the meaning of the English questions, the English survey was ﬁrst
translated into Swedish and then reverse translated into English.
Schwartz (1992) identiﬁes the 10 main value priorities in life, which he describes as:
1. Self-Direction: Independent thought and action; choosing, creating, exploring.
2. Stimulation: Excitement, novelty, and challenge in life.
3. Hedonism: Pleasure and sensuous gratiﬁcation for oneself.
4. Achievement: Personal success through demonstrating competence according to social stan-
dards.
5. Power: Social status and prestige, control or dominance over people and resources.
6. Security: Safety, harmony, and stability of society, or relationships, and of self.
7. Conformity: Restraint of actions, inclinations, and impulses likely to upset or harm others
and violate social expectations or norms.
108. Tradition: Respect, commitment, and acceptance of the customs and ideas that traditional
culture or religion provide the self.
9. Benevolence: Preserving and enhancing the welfare of those with whom one is in frequent
personal contact (the “in-group”).
10. Universalism: Understanding, appreciation, tolerance, and protection for the welfare of all
people and for nature.
Generally, the PVQ poses between three to six questions for each value dimension. For instance,
to measure power, one question is: “It is important to him to be rich. He wants to have a lot of
money and expensive things”, for which the respondent has to state how much like this person
he/she is (answers ranging from 6, very much like me, to 1, not like me at all). For the complete
set of questions that refer to a speciﬁc value, see the Appendix.
Individual values are created by taking the average score of the questions that relate to a certain
value and subtracting the mean individual score over all 40 questions to correct for diﬀerences
in individuals’ use of the response scale. By correcting for individual diﬀerences in “answering
priorities”, one can cleanly identify individual’s relative value priorities. When dealing with values
it is common to drop respondents who skipped too many items, who did not tried to discriminate
among their values or who responded in ways suggesting deliberate misrepresentation. In our case,
most individuals answered all questions. Thus, we did not drop individuals from the data because
of missing data. However, we dropped speciﬁc values for individuals if more than 30% of the value
items were missing. We also dropped responses for individuals who indicated the same scale for 25
(or more) out of the 40 value questions (3 occurrences).
We measure risk aversion using a standard question in the literature (see e.g. Dohmen, Falk,
Hoﬀmann & Sunde, 2006). The question we asked was the following: “Imagine you had won SEK
111,000,000 in a lottery.7 Almost immediately after you collect, you receive the following oﬀer from a
reputable bank: There is a chance to double the money within two years. It is equally possible that
you could lose half of the money invested. Which amount of SEK 1,000,000 would you invest?: 1
(0 SEK), 2 (200,000 SEK) , 3 (400,000 SEK), 4 (600,000 SEK) , 5 (800,000 SEK), 6 (1,000,000).”
Higher answers to this risk question therefore indicate a higher level of risk-taking.
3.3 Summary Statistics
The top part of Table 1 presents summary statistics for the reported values and the risk aversion
question for all respondents. For ease of interpretation, we recoded values so that higher numbers
denote higher value priorities. Remember that we work with relative value priorities, i.e. the
absolute score for a certain value minus the individual’s mean response.
Survey respondents generally rank high on benevolence and self-direction values, and low on the
value measuring tradition. Stated values are correlated as expected (see Table A1): people who are
ambitious (high power and achievement values) are less caring (low benevolence and universalism
values), and people who are conservative (high security, conformity and tradition values) need less
stimulation and change (low stimulation, self-direction and hedonism values). Concerning risk-
taking, Swedish directors would choose to invest on average a bit less than 1/3 of the 1,000,000
SEK in the lottery.
— insert Table 1 about here —
The lower part of Table 1 reports summary statistics for individual characteristics, split up by
respondent and non-respondent. Respondents and non-respondents appear quite similar, except
that the share of CEOs and worker-representative directors is slightly lower in the respondent
sample. Interestingly, women show no diﬀerent respondence behavior than men: 17 percent of
71,000,000 SEK corresponds roughly to $120,000.
12the directors are female, and 17 percent of the respondents are female. Diﬀerences in respondence
behavior between men and women are also statistically insigniﬁcant.
4 Gender Diﬀerences in The Boardroom
4.1 Gender Gaps in Values and Risk-Attitudes
To what extent are female directors diﬀerent from their male counterpart? To get an answer to
this answer, we would like to compare male and female directors in their value priorities and risk
attitudes. Since we are primarily interested in comparing male and female directors who made
it into the boardroom by other means than employment law, we exclude worker-representatives.
That leaves us with a sample of 499 directors. Since CEOs are also board members, we include
CEOs in our director category, although our results are similar if we exclude them.
If we label the (relative) values by Yx, where x  {1,...,10}, and the risk answer by Y11 then for
each x  {1,...,11}, we estimate a model of the following type:
Yxi = α + βFemalei + εi
Here Female is a dummy variable taking a value of 1 if the director is female, and 0 otherwise.
Since women in the board are on average slightly younger than men (50 years versus 54 years,
t-statistic of 7 for diﬀerences in means), we also control for age in the regressions. To allow for
possible non-linear eﬀects, we perform saturated regressions with dummy variables for all realized
values of age.8 To correct for possible interdependencies among directors from the same ﬁrm, we
8The estimated gender eﬀects are quite similar if age enters the regressions linearly, or if we use dummies
for diﬀerent age categories; we present alternative speciﬁcations in Table 5.
13correct the standard errors for group correlation at the ﬁrm level and potential heteroskedasticity.
If a director sits on more than one board, we assign them to one of their board seats at random
before correcting the standard errors.
— insert Table 2 about here —
Table 2 documents that female and male directors diﬀer in most, but not all value dimensions.
Female directors care more about benevolence, universalism and stimulation. On the other hand,
they care less about power, security, conformity and tradition. Surprisingly, women in the board-
room are also slightly more risk-loving than men. All this evidence suggests that gender diﬀerences
do not disappear above the class-ceiling.
How robust are these result? We investigate this issue below.
4.2 Sample Selection
One major concern with survey data is sample selection bias. While most studies relying on
survey data have no means to address this issue,9 our information on respondents as well as
non-respondents allows us to estimate a Heckman selection correction model. As an additional
exogenous variable in the participation equation, we use the number of co-workers who ﬁlled out
the survey.
The model is estimated with Maximum Likelihood, and standard errors are clustered at the
company level, as above. The top part of Table 3 presents the previous OLS results, the bottom
part provides the results from the Heckman selection model.
— insert Table 3 about here —
9The European Social Survey and the World Value Survey, for example, provide data for respondents
only.
14As is clear from the table, correcting for sample selection does not alter the estimated gender
gaps in value priorities by much. Although selection plays a role (directors with high security,
conformity and tradition values are less likely and directors with high self-direction and stimulation
values are more likely to be among the respondents), the selection does not seem to be gender
speciﬁc.
4.3 Within-Firm Variation
So far, we compare the values and risk attitudes of male and female directors at the individual level.
However, it could be the case that certain companies’ boards are attractive to board members with
speciﬁc values, and that within a certain company, gender diﬀerences disappear. In that case,
diversity in the boardroom no longer exists.10
To test this for this possibility, we construct a new data set at the directorship, i.e. director-ﬁrm
level. In this data each director is matched to all of his or her directorships and thus may occur
more than once. We end with a sample of 718 observations. Using this sample, we re-run the
previous regressions controlling for ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects.
— insert Table 4 about here —
The results in Table 4 strongly suggest that even within ﬁrms, gender diﬀerences persist. As
before, female directors appear less power oriented, more benevolent, and rank lower on security,
conformity and tradition. They value high stimulation and self-direction and are willing to take
higher risks (although the last coeﬃcient is no longer statistically signiﬁcant). Thus, the gender
diﬀerences we document do not appear to be driven by corporate culture or omitted ﬁrm eﬀects.
10At the industry level, the share of women is high in industries with traditionally female customers
(household products, apparels, food), and low in typically male-dominated areas (cars, telecommunications,
technology); see Table A2. Even though it is still possible that within industries, women and men self-select
into companies where similar values are shared, knowledge about the industry seems to be important for
male or female representation.
154.4 Controlling for More Observables
So far we were very parsimonious in the use of controls. The reason is that many individual
characteristics except for gender and age may be inﬂuenced by an individual’s value system and
therefore be endogenous. Nevertheless, it is important to ensure that the gender diﬀerences we
document are not driven by omitted unobservables. Moreover, it is be interesting to see whether
there is a correlation between a director’s marital status and his/her reported values. Also, to get
a sense about the role of age, we now display age dummies for ﬁve-year intervals in the regression.
The omitted age group consists of directors younger than 40.
— insert Table 5 about here —
Table 5 shows that older directors care less about achievement and hedonism, but report higher
values for tradition. This is plausible and re-assures us that the stated values are indeed meaningful.
As for family status, married directors value stimulation less. It is possible that directors who care
a lot about stimulation are less likely to get married. Alternatively, marriage might lead directors
to care less about stimulation.
It is noticeable that for each value our estimates of the gender dummy are quite similar across
speciﬁcations. They do not seem to depend much on whether we include more controls, whether we
rely on within-ﬁrm or cross-sectional variation, or whether or not we correct for sample-selection.
Therefore, our estimated gender diﬀerences in the boardroom appear quite robust.
5 Directors, Worker Representatives, and Non-Directors
In Section 4, we document not only that female directors diﬀer from male directors, but also that
female directors appear to be diﬀerent in ways that contradict previous ﬁndings concerning gender
gaps. For example, previous value surveys have documented that women are more security and
16tradition oriented, but less stimulation oriented, than men (Schwartz & Rubel, 2005). A natural
question is whether our sample is biased. Even though we survey the entire population of Swedish
directors and selection does not seem to drive our results, it is possible that relying on Swedish
data matters: the “typical” gender gaps that exists in other countries might not exist at the
population level in Sweden, so that our results simply reﬂect “atypical” patterns of genders gaps
in the Swedish population. We investigate these issues further in this Section. First, we investigate
whether directors who made it into the boardroom through the competitive labor market diﬀer from
directors who achieved their position partially in response to the law, i.e. worker representative
directors. Because worker representatives are supposed to represent workers, ex ante we expect
them to be more benevolent and universalist than other directors. If this is indeed the case, then
this suggests that the directors values are meaningful. Second, we investigate whether gender gaps
in the boardroom diﬀer from those for the general Swedish population. While interesting in its
own right, we also think that this analysis has important policy implications. Several countries are
thinking about increasing the share of women on the boards, either through informal guidelines as
in Spain, or by a legal quota as in Norway. Our analysis clariﬁes that women who get into the
boardroom as a result of employment law or a direct gender quota may diﬀer signiﬁcantly from
women who achieved their seats without regulatory measures.
5.1 Directors Versus Worker-Representative Directors
In this Section, we analyze the responses of all Swedish board members, including worker represen-
tatives. Comparing worker representatives and “regular” directors is interesting for two reasons:
First, we would expect worker representatives to be quite diﬀerent from other directors. Thus, the
comparison serves as a robustness check that the director values are meaningful. Second, companies
in countries with co-determination (e.g. Sweden, Germany) can increase the share of women in the
17boardroom by appointing more female worker representatives. Our analysis highlights the ways in
which female board members who are recruited from within the company’s employees and female
board members who are recruited in the market for executives may diﬀer.
To be able to compare the two director types, we estimate the following model for each x,
(x = 1,...,11):
Yxi = α + β · Femalei + γ · Directori + δ · Female · Directori + εi
Director measures a ”regular” (i.e. non worker representative) director, and the estimated
coeﬃcients can be interpreted with the following conditional expectations in mind:
E[Yx | Female = 0,Director = 0] = α
E[Yx | Female = 0,Director = 1] = α + γ
E[Yx | Female = 1,Director = 0] = α + β
E[Yx | Female = 1,Director = 1] = α + β + γ + δ
If β 6= 0, female worker representatives are diﬀerent from their male counterpart. If γ 6= 0,
male directors diﬀer from male non-directors, and if additionally δ = 0, the gender gap among the
worker representatives is the same as the gender gap among the “regular” directors. Finally, female
directors are diﬀerent from female worker representatives, if γ + δ 6= 0.
The top panel of Table 6 shows the regression results. First, from the estimated γ, we see that
directors are fundamentally diﬀerent from worker representatives, and in expected ways. Directors
care more about achievement and power, and less about benevolence and universalism than worker
representatives.11 Using Schwartz’s terminology, directors rank high on self-enhancement values
11This ﬁnding parallels Gneezy & Rustichini’s (2006) ﬁnding that executives are more competitive than
teachers: the former choose competitive incentive schemes more frequently than the latter.
18and low on self-transcendence values. Directors also diﬀer from worker representatives along their
attitudes towards change. They prioritize self direction and stimulation, at the cost of security,
conformity and tradition. Female Directors diﬀer from female worker representatives primarily
through the eﬀect of being director (apart from the risk attitude question, the interaction terms δ
are insigniﬁcant). Therefore, women who acquired their seat in the boardroom through competition
are more power and achievement oriented than worker representatives of the same sex. Also, they
are less traditional and more open to change. Note also that they are signiﬁcantly more risk loving.
In fact, female directors diﬀer from all the other members in the boardroom by a signiﬁcantly
higher willingness to take risks.
— insert Table 6 about here —
5.2 Directors Versus Educated Swedes
So far we have demonstrated that female directors have diﬀerent values than male directors. Since
the European Social Survey asked a representative sample of the Swedish population the same
Schwartz value questions, we are able to compare values of directors to those in the broader popu-
lation. The European Social Survey (ESS) is a biennial multi-country survey. It collects information
about people’s behavior patterns, attitudes and beliefs, as measured using a 21-item Schwartz value
survey, in at least 23 European countries. The ﬁrst round was ﬁelded in 2002/2003, the second in
2004/2005 and the third in 2006/2007. We use the ESS from 2006/2007. The ESS sampling report
for 2006/2007 provides the following information for the 2006/2007 survey in Sweden:12
1) Target population: Residents in Sweden older than 15 (regardless of nationality, citizenship,
language or legal status).
2) Sampling Frame: Register of the population, which includes all individuals living in Sweden.
12Using the 2004/2005 ESS survey as a basis for comparison provides similar results.
193) Contact: By telephone, to set up the time for the interview.
4) Sampling design: Single stage (without clustering) probability sample. Fully random sample
of individuals (equal probability selection) born before 1 September 1978.
5) Design eﬀects: No stratiﬁcation, no clustering, equal probabilities
6) Number of selected people: 3000, number of interviewed: 1995.
Because the ESS does not provide information about the people who did not respond, there is
no way to correct for sample selection when using ESS data. The basis for our comparison between
Swedish directors and non directors are all respondents who gave valid responses to the 21 items of
the (short version of the) Schwartz value survey: 1519 respondents from the ESS survey, and 625
respondents from our director survey, respectively. Since the short version of the Schwartz value
survey (containing 21 items) is a subset of the long version of the Schwartz value survey (containing
40 items), it is straightforward to match the responses from our director survey to the responses
from the ESS survey by restricting the analysis to the 21 common value questions.
To consider the potential eﬀects of gender quotas, it seems most interesting to compare the
directors in our sample to the group of non-directors who are of similar age, between 25 and 74
years, and in possession of a university degree. The bottom panel of Table 6 reports results from
the same type of analysis as before, except that now the non-directors are the highly educated
Swedes, and no longer the worker representatives. Unfortunately, the ESS contains no risk aversion
question, so we can only make the comparison with respect to values. As can be seen from the
estimated β, Swedish women care less about power and achievement, but more about benevolence
and universalism than Swedish men. Also, women care relatively less about stimulation. Whether
these gender gaps prevail at the director level can be seen from the interaction terms. Since the
interaction term is insigniﬁcant for achievement, power, benevolence and universalism, the same
gender gaps that exist in the Swedish non-director population also exist at the director level. In
contrast, however, the gender gaps at the director level are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from the Swedish
20non-director comparison group for security, conformity, tradition and stimulation. While women
are quite comparable to men along these dimensions in the Swedish population, female directors
care relatively less about security, conformity, tradition and more about stimulation than their
male colleagues. Therefore, the very speciﬁc sample of female directors causes gender gaps at the
director level to be “atypical” when it comes to preferences for conservation and change. Our
previous concern that this result might have been caused by “atypical” gender gaps in the Swedish
population is unconﬁrmed.
We round up this discussion with a few observations: First among the Swedish population
of highly educated people, women and men report diﬀerent values. Men care more about self-
enhancing values (power, achievement), and less about self-transcendence values (benevolence,
universalism). The same gender gap is found at the director level. No matter whether we compare
male and female worker representatives, or male and female “regular directors”, women appear
to be more caring about others and less caring about themselves. Even though the gender gaps
among directors and non directors are similar, the level of the values are diﬀerent. Female and male
directors are generally more ambitious than non-directors, and less caring than them. However,
men more so than women.
However, regular female directors diﬀer from their male colleagues in diﬀerent ways than
Swedish women diﬀer from Swedish men in general. Among the highly educated Swedes, women
appear slightly more traditional and security oriented than men, and they care less about stimula-
tion. However, at the director level, exactly the opposite is true. Women are less traditional and
less security oriented; they value conformity less than men, but care more about stimulation than
their male colleagues. Therefore, the gender gaps that exist among the highly educated Swedes
are reversed when we compare regular directors. Due to the fact that female directors are a very
selected group of women with a high need for stimulation and a low demand for security, it makes
sense that they are also willing to take more risks. As to be expected, that is no longer true if we
21compare worker representative directors: if anything, female worker representatives are more risk
averse than male worker representatives.
How do female directors compare with female worker representatives and Swedish women with
a university degree? Clearly, the ﬁrst group distinguishes itself from the latter two by valuing self-
enhancement (power, achievement) more and self-transcendence (benevolence, universalism) less.
Furthermore, they value stimulation substantially higher, and conservatism lower. Most strikingly,
they are substantially more risk loving and less concerned about security. In all aspects, women
who have succeeded in the market for executives are diﬀerent from female workers who get into the
boardroom as a result of employment law and from the sample of Swedish women in possession of
a university degree.
6 Discussion
The initial question we asked was: are women in the boardroom diﬀerent from men? Our study
answers yes. Male directors value achievement and power relatively more, and benevolence and
universalism relatively less. Women, on the other hand, care more about stimulation, and less
about security, conformity and tradition. While the ﬁrst set of gender gaps are consistent with the
gender gaps in the population of highly educated Swedes, the latter are not. Therefore, women who
make it into the board of companies are a very selected sample with a high taste for stimulation,
and a low need for security. Thus, it is not necessarily surprising that, compared to their male
colleagues, female directors are willing to take higher risks.
Are these results generalizable to other countries? There are two pieces of evidence that suggests
that they may be. First, the diﬀerences in value priorities between men and women in the general
Swedish population are similar to those reported for other countries. This suggests that the Swedish
population is not an outlier in terms of gender gaps. Second, Adams and Ferreira (2008) document
22that more gender-diverse boards in the US have more equity-based pay for directors. This is
consistent with our ﬁnding that female directors are more risk-loving than male directors.
What are some potential implications for corporate policies?13 First, we believe our results
provide some insight into why gender diversity appear to have an eﬀect on corporate outcomes,
as documented, for example, in Adams and Ferreira (2008) and Levi, Li & Zhang (2008). Our
results suggest that male and female directors have diﬀerent priorities, which may lead gender
diverse boards to also behave diﬀerently. Second, our results suggest that changing the gender
composition of boards may have long-lasting eﬀects. Despite being in the same position as male
directors, female directors are not indistinguishable from them in their priorities. Third, having
more female directors need not lead to more risk-averse decision-making. Fourth, our results suggest
that more gender-diverse boards may embrace stakeholder interests to a greater extent. Adams,
Licht and Sagiv (2008) show that power, self-direction and achievement correlate positively, and
universalism correlates negatively, with directors’ willingness to consider shareholder interests above
stakeholder interests. Since female directors care less about power and more about universalism
than male directors, it is possible that more gender diverse boards consider stakeholders interests
more broadly. Finally, the values of directors are likely to aﬀect ethical decision making. So far,
psychological research points to a positive correlation between ethical behavior and self-reported
importance of altruistic values (Bond & Chi, 1997; Fritzsche & Oz, 2007). Thus, female directors
embrace values that precede ethical decisions more strongly than male directors.
13Since we have responses for all board members for only a few ﬁrms, it is not clear that it would be
informative to directly correlate our survey responses with measures of corporate outcomes.
237 Appendix: Questions related to the diﬀerent values
Self-Direction:
1.Thinking up new ideas and being creative is important to him. He likes to do things in his
own original way.
2. It is important to him to make his own decisions about what he does. He likes to be free
to plan and to choose his activities for himself.
3. He thinks it’s important to be interested in things. He likes to be curious and to try to
understand all sorts of things.
4. It is important to him to be independent. He likes to rely on himself.
Stimulation:
1. He thinks it is important to do lots of diﬀerent things in life. He always looks for new
things to try.
2. He likes to take risks. He is always looking for adventures.
3. He likes surprises. It is important to him to have an exciting life.
Hedonism:
1. He seeks every chance he can to have fun. It is important to him to do things that give
him pleasure.
2. Enjoying life’s pleasures is important to him. He likes to ’spoil’ himself.
3. He really wants to enjoy life. Having a good time is very important to him.
Achievement:
1. It’s very important to him to show his abilities. He wants people to admire what he does.
2. Being very successful is important to him. He likes to impress other people.
3. He thinks it is important to be ambitious. He wants to show how capable he is.
4. Getting ahead in life is important to him. He strives to do better than others.
Power:
1. It is important to him to be rich. He wants to have a lot of money and expensive things.
2. It is important to him to be in charge and tell others what to do. He wants people to do
what he says.
3. He always wants to be the one who makes the decisions. He likes to be the leader.
Security:
1. It is important to him to live in secure surroundings. He avoids anything that might
endanger his safety.
2. It is very important to him that his country be safe. He thinks the state must be on
watch against threats from within and without.
3. It is important to him that things be organized and clean. He really does not like things
to be a mess.
4. He tries hard to avoid getting sick. Staying healthy is very important to him.
5. Having a stable government is important to him. He is concerned that the social order
be protected.
24Conformity:
1. He believes that people should do what they’re told. He thinks people should follow rules
at all times, even when no-one is watching.
2. It is important to him always to behave properly. He wants to avoid doing anything
people would say is wrong.
3. He believes he should always show respect to his parents and to older people. It is
important to him to be obedient.
4. It is important to him to be polite to other people all the time. He tries never to disturb
or irritate others.
Tradition:
1. He thinks it’s important not to ask for more than what you have. He believes that people
should be satisﬁed with what they have.
2. Religious belief is important to him. He tries hard to do what his religion requires.
3. He thinks it is best to do things in traditional ways. It is important to him to keep up
the customs he has learned.
4. It is important to him to be humble and modest. He tries not to draw attention to
himself.
Benevolence:
1. It’s very important to him to help the people around him. He wants to care for their
well-being.
2. It is important to him to be loyal to his friends. He wants to devote himself to people
close to him.
3. It is important to him to respond to the needs of others. He tries to support those he
knows.
4. Forgiving people who have hurt him is important to him. He tries to see what is good in
them and not to hold a grudge.
Universalism:
1. He thinks it is important that every person in the world be treated equally. He believes
everyone should have equal opportunities in life.
2. It is important to him to listen to people who are diﬀerent from him. Even when he
disagrees with them, he still wants to understand them.
3. He strongly believes that people should care for nature. Looking after the environment
is important to him.
4. He believes all the worlds’ people should live in harmony. Promoting peace among all
groups in the world is important to him.
5. He wants everyone to be treated justly, even people he doesn’t know. It is important to
him to protect the weak in society.
6. It is important to him to adapt to nature and to ﬁt into it. He believes that people should
not change nature.
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29Summary Statistics 
Observations Mean Std.  Dev. Min Max
Values (relative)
Achievement 625 0.02 0.76 -2.4 2.35
Power 625 -0.44 0.74 -3.18 1.94
Security 625 -0.06 0.63 -2.03 1.43
Conformity 625 -0.28 0.73 -2.35 1.83
Tradition 625 -1.25 0.59 -3.10 0.47
Benevolence 625 0.56 0.59 -1.55 2.25
Universalism 625 0.38 0.63 -1.50 2.55
Self-Direction 625 0.91 0.63 -1.25 2.85
Stimulation 625 -0.13 0.86 -2.65 2.55
Hedonism 625 -0.04 0.88 -2.65 2.38
Measure Risk-Aversion
Investment: 1 (0%) to 6 (100%) 617 2.63 1.42 1 6
Individual Characteristics (respondents)
Female Dummy 628 0.17 0.37 0 1
Age 628 54.28 9.15 25 74
Marital Status Dummy 628 0.79 0.41 0 1
Nr. Kids 628 2.18 1.16 0 7
CEO-Dummy 628 0.20 0.40 0 1
Worker-Representative-Dummy 628 0.20 0.40 0 1
Individual Characteristics (all directors)
Female Dummy 1796 0.17 0.38 0 1
Age 1796 53.07 9.20 25 81
Marital Status Dummy 1796 0.76 0.42 0 1
Nr. Kids 1796 2.12 1.14 0 7
CEO-Dummy 1796 0.24 0.42 0 1
Worker-Representative-Dummy 1796 0.23 0.42 0 1
TABLE 1
Notes: The data are from the Swedish director sample. The values are for the survey respondents. The raw value
scores range between 1 and 6, with higher numbers reflecting a higher importance of the respective value
dimension. Relative values are centered around the individual's mean response and reflect a respondant's relative
value priorities in life. The risk measure is the individuals' answer to how much of 1,000,000 SEK they would invest
in a fair lottery (with equal chances of winning the double or loosing half): 0 (1), 20,000 (2), 40,000 (3), 60,000 (4),
80,000 (5), 1,000,000 (6). The first set of individual characteristics is for the survey respondents, the second set for
the population of surveyed directors. Marital Status is a dummy variable taking a value of 1 if married, and 0
otherwise. Nr. Kids is the number of children. Achievement Power Security Conformity Tradition Benevolence
Female Director -0.042 -0.323 -0.183 -0.346 -0.207 0.31
(0.103) (0.097)*** (0.090)** (0.099)*** (0.076)*** (0.079)***
Constant 0.287 0.162 0.862 0.037 -1.838 0.037
(0.065)*** (0.219) (0.343)** (0.306) (0.028)*** (0.25)
Observations 499 499 499 499 499 499
R-squared 0.11 0.14 0.12 0.11 0.1 0.12
Universalism Self-Direction Stimulation Hedonism Risk
Female Director 0.298 0.093 0.257 0.036 0.296
(0.080)*** (0.086) (0.103)** (0.114) (0.178)*
Constant -0.338 0.537 -0.171 0.496 2.5
(0.028)*** (0.065)*** (0.522) (0.275)* (0.371)***
Observations 499 499 499 499 491
R-squared 0.12 0.08 0.11 0.12 0.07
TABLE 2
Values and risk attitudes of male and female directors
Notes: The sample consists of the directors that responded to the survey and who are not Worker Representatives. Dependent
variables are the centered value dimensions and the risk measure. Female Director is a Dummy Variable taking a value of 1, if
female, and 0 otherwise. Age dummies are used as a control variables. Standard errors are clustered at the company level. ***
denote significance at the 1% level, ** significance at the 5% level, and * significance at the 10% level.Achiev. Power Security Conformity Tradition Benev. Univers. Self-Direction Stimulation Hedonism Risk
Female Exec. -0.042 -0.323 -0.183 -0.346 -0.207 0.31 0.298 0.093 0.257 0.036 0.296
(0.103) (0.097)*** (0.090)** (0.099)*** (0.076)*** (0.079)*** (0.080)*** (0.086) (0.103)** (0.114) (0.178)*
Observations 499 499 499 499 499 499 499 499 499 499 491
R Squared 0.11 0.14 0.12 0.11 0.1 0.12 0.12 0.08 0.11 0.12 0.07
Part. Equ. Achiev. Power Security Conformity Tradition Benev. Univers. Self-Direction Stimulation Hedonism Risk
Female Exec. -0.095 -0.041 -0.323 -0.183 -0.349 -0.21 0.31 0.297 0.094 0.259 0.036 0.294
(0.102) (0.099) (0.093)*** (0.090)** (0.099)*** (0.075)*** (0.076)*** (0.077)*** (0.088) (0.101)** (0.109) (0.170)*
Number-Resp. 0.212
(0.045)***
ρ (Rho) 0.202  -0.162  -0.485  -0.417   -0.447 0.13   -0.168  0.615 0.426  0.124  -0.058 
S.E. of ρ 0.169 0.257 0.222  0.193 0.219 0.230    0.265   0.128 0.169 0.196  0.164 
λ (Lambda) 0.141 -0.108 -0.31  -0.301 -0.262 0.073  -0.096  0.414  0.366 0.104  -0.083 
S.E. of λ 0.121 0.175 0.168    0.156 0.147  0.13    0.154   0.116  0.165   0.167  0.234
Log-Pseudolikelihood -1336.88 -1319.18 -1259.22 -1330.5 -1222.38 -1230.56 -1240.198   -1254.804  -1416.529  -1436.247  -1677.63
Observations 1378 1378 1378 1378 1378 1378 1378 1378 1378 1378 1378 1370
p-Value for Wald-Test of 0.245 0.535 0.068 0.057 0.079 0.576 0.533 0.0005 0.028  0.532  0.722
independent equations
TABLE 3
Notes: The sample consists of all non worker-representative directors. Dependent variables are the centered value dimensions and the risk attitude. Female Executive is a Dummy Variable taking a value
of 1, if female, and 0 otherwise. Age dummies are used as control variables. Number Respondents is the number of directors per company that filled out the survey. Standard errors are clustered at the
company level. *** denote significance at the 1% level, ** significance at the 5% level, and * significance at the 10% level.
 Gender Gap in Values, Directors (OLS versus Heckman)Achievement Power Security Conformity Tradition Benevolence
Female Director -0.039 -0.235 -0.186 -0.394 -0.205 0.245
(0.108) (0.110)** (0.091)** (0.096)*** (0.083)** (0.094)***
Firm-Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 718 718 718 718 718 718
R-squared 0.51 0.52 0.52 0.52 0.47 0.49
Universalism Self-Direction Stimulation Hedonism Risk
Female Director 0.227 0.23 0.376 -0.063 0.287
(0.089)** (0.092)** (0.113)*** (0.138) (0.217)
Firm-Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 718 718 718 718 707
R-squared 0.48 0.48 0.47 0.5 0.43
Notes: The sample consists of all director-firm matches for directors that responded to the survey. Dependent variables are the
centered value dimensions and the risk measure. Female Director is a Dummy Variable taking a value of 1, if female, and 0
otherwise. Age dummies are used as control variables. All estimations include firm level fixed effects. Robust standard errors
reported. *** denote significance at the 1% level, ** significance at the 5% level, and * significance at the 10% level.
TABLE 4 
Values and risk attitudes: Within-Firm-Variation Achievement Power Security Conformity Tradition Benevolence
Female Director -0.015 -0.322 -0.22 -0.362 -0.212 0.326
(0.108) (0.100)*** (0.092)** (0.098)*** (0.077)*** (0.081)***
Age 41-45 -0.063 0.018 -0.011 0.091 0.221 -0.09
(0.211) (0.18) (0.169) (0.187) (0.141) (0.146)
Age 46-50 -0.204 -0.037 0.038 -0.136 0.377 0.068
(0.195) (0.186) (0.158) (0.167) (0.141)*** (0.137)
Age 51-55 -0.284 0.02 -0.1 -0.092 0.268 0.039
(0.197) (0.178) (0.157) (0.162) (0.139)* (0.138)
Age 56-60 -0.191 -0.069 0.008 -0.041 0.341 0.008
(0.195) (0.181) (0.165) (0.164) (0.141)** (0.144)
Age 61-65 -0.311 0.007 0.133 0.054 0.41 0.031
(0.187)* (0.174) (0.152) (0.163) (0.137)*** (0.127)
Age 66-70 -0.236 -0.037 0.205 0.126 0.328 -0.044
(0.214) (0.187) (0.178) (0.176) (0.155)** (0.147)
Age 70 plus -0.463 -0.02 0.013 0.404 0.427 0.061
(0.354) (0.248) (0.205) (0.262) (0.218)* (0.17)
Married 0.126 0.079 0.022 0.09 0.023 -0.074
(0.08) (0.095) (0.068) (0.086) (0.061) (0.069)
Nr. Kids 0.006 -0.035 -0.016 -0.035 -0.031 0.019
(0.028) (0.032) (0.028) (0.032) (0.024) (0.027)
Constant 0.236 -0.273 -0.098 -0.309 -1.506 0.49
(0.187) (0.18) (0.149) (0.160)* (0.126)*** (0.125)***
Observations 499 499 499 499 499 499
R-squared 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.06 0.04 0.04
TABLE 5 
Notes: See Table 2. New controls are a dummy for marital status, and a count variable for the number of kids. Standard errors are
clustered at the company level. *** denote significance at the 1% level, ** significance at the 5% level, and * significance at the 10% level.
Gender Gaps at the Director level: Full set of controls (1)Universalism Self-Direction Stimulation Hedonism Risk
Female Director 0.345 0.121 0.21 -0.018 0.313
(0.086)*** (0.09) (0.101)** (0.115) (0.179)*
Age 41-45 -0.044 0.102 0.21 -0.469 0.352
(0.16) (0.178) (0.192) (0.265)* (0.377)
Age 46-50 0.045 0.099 0.009 -0.402 0.011
(0.159) (0.159) (0.179) (0.25) (0.367)
Age 51-55 0.099 0.097 0.345 -0.425 0.165
(0.157) (0.158) (0.185)* (0.247)* (0.365)
Age 56-60 0.091 0.116 0.187 -0.619 -0.061
(0.154) (0.16) (0.188) (0.251)** (0.334)
Age 61-65 0.18 0.042 -0.104 -0.78 0.086
(0.149) (0.155) (0.176) (0.243)*** (0.321)
Age 66-70 0.042 0.027 0.06 -0.724 0.298
(0.164) (0.176) (0.191) (0.276)*** (0.365)
Age 70 plus -0.184 0.244 0.257 -0.779 -0.164
(0.193) (0.199) (0.304) (0.274)*** (0.552)
Married 0.063 -0.054 -0.228 -0.153 0.031
(0.064) (0.073) (0.102)** (0.106) (0.162)
Nr. Kids 0.023 0.039 0.018 -0.004 0.012
(0.022) (0.03) (0.039) (0.037) (0.061)
Constant 0.081 0.841 -0.029 0.636 2.434
(0.145) (0.131)*** (0.17) (0.224)*** (0.302)***
Observations 499 499 499 499 491
R-squared 0.05 0.01 0.05 0.05 0.01
TABLE 5 
Notes: See Table 2. New controls are a dummy for marital status, and a count variable for the number of kids. Standard errors are
clustered at the company level. *** denote significance at the 1% level, ** significance at the 5% level, and * significance at the 10%
level.
Gender Gaps at the Director level: Full set of controls (2)Achiev. Power Security Conformity Tradition Benev. Univers. Self-Direction Stimulation Hedonism Risk
Female -0.277 -0.27 -0.128 -0.115 -0.147 0.318 0.342 0.093 0.067 -0.083 -0.313
(0.120)** (0.113)** (0.124) (0.123) (0.122) (0.104)*** (0.107)*** (0.144) (0.15) (0.152) (0.245)
Director 0.505 0.451 -0.287 -0.443 -0.13 -0.111 -0.311 0.362 0.447 -0.046 -0.132
(0.091)*** (0.089)*** (0.071)*** (0.075)*** (0.075)* (0.066)* (0.074)*** (0.072)*** (0.097)*** (0.098) (0.155)
Female * Director 0.244 -0.028 -0.08 -0.224 -0.043 0.003 -0.034 0.001 0.151 0.093 0.641
(0.162) (0.145) (0.141) (0.157) (0.143) (0.141) (0.138) (0.166) (0.175) (0.192) (0.308)**
Constant -0.165 -0.783 0.172 0.117 -1.406 0.64 0.466 0.561 -0.5 0.405 2.763
(0.158) (0.129)*** (0.129) (0.115) (0.093)*** (0.096)*** (0.115)*** (0.101)*** (0.147)*** (0.166)** (0.245)***
Observations 625 625 625 625 625 625 625 625 625 625 617
R Squared 0.1 0.09 0.06 0.1 0.04 0.06 0.1 0.05 0.07 0.03 0.01
Achiev. Power Security Conformity Tradition Benev. Univers. Self-Direction Stimulation Hedonism
Female -0.209 -0.211 0.099 0.016 0.131 0.262 0.158 0.006 -0.322 -0.001
(0.073)*** (0.068)*** (0.077) (0.08) (0.076)* (0.054)*** (0.056)*** (0.067) (0.082)*** (0.078)
Director 0.571 0.465 0.325 0.058 -0.951 -0.186 -0.545 0.197 0.224 0.053
(0.073)*** (0.068)*** (0.072)*** (0.075) (0.071)*** (0.053)*** (0.057)*** (0.065)*** (0.081)*** (0.082)
Female * Director 0.153 -0.112 -0.304 -0.343 -0.285 0.057 0.172 0.084 0.53 -0.003
(0.126) (0.117) (0.113)*** (0.125)*** (0.108)*** (0.096) (0.097)* (0.109) (0.131)*** (0.139)
Constant -0.263 -0.592 -0.467 -0.396 -0.341 0.644 0.574 0.581 -0.277 0.264
(0.070)*** (0.065)*** (0.070)*** (0.071)*** (0.068)*** (0.051)*** (0.052)*** (0.060)*** (0.074)*** (0.072)***
Observations 1007 1002 1005 1002 1007 1006 1008 1004 1007 1006
R Squared 0.16 0.13 0.05 0.04 0.35 0.09 0.18 0.06 0.09 0.05
TABLE 6
Notes: The sample in the top part of the table consists of all directors that responded to the survey - worker representatives and non worker representatives. The sample in the bottom part of
the table is a combined sample of the Swedish Director Survey and EES (European Social Survey) survey, third round. All individuals older than 24 and in the possession of a university
degree are in the sample. In both parts of the table, the dependent variables are the 10 value dimensions, as identified by Schwartz. All value dimensions are centered around the individuals'
mean response and measure their relative value priorities. Female Director is a Dummy Variable taking a value of 1, if female, and 0 otherwise. Director is a dummy variable taking a value of
1, if the individual is a non worker representative director. Age dummies are used as control variables. Robust standard errors are reported. *** denote significance at the 1% level, **
significance at the 5% level, and * significance at the 10% level.
Directors, Worker Representatives, and Non Directors
Directors versus Worker Representatives
Directors versus Swedish PopulationAchievement Power Security Conformity Tradition Benevolence Universalism Self-Direction Stimulation Hedonism
Achievement 1
Power 0.4210  1
Security  -0.1621  -0.1551 1
Conformity -0.2415   -0.0560  0.3068  1
Tradition -0.4957    -0.3307   0.1694   0.2774  1
Benevolence -0.3232  -0.4001 -0.0828 -0.1243 0.0962    1
Universalism -0.4292   -0.4879  -0.0790  -0.1077   0.1308  0.3070  1
Self-Direction  0.0660  0.0293  -0.3093 -0.3854  -0.3584  -0.0442  -0.0273   1
Stimulation  0.1696  0.0563 -0.4938 -0.4365  -0.4076 -0.1470  -0.1738   0.2356  1
Hedonism 0.0187  0.0254  -0.2816  -0.3429  -0.1978   -0.0974  -0.2514  -0.0334   0.2375  1
TABLE A1 
Notes: Bold values are those with correlations higher than 40 percent.
Correlations between the ValuesIndustry Gics-Code Av. Percentage # Firms
(4 digit) Female Directors  per
per Industry  Industry
Energy 1010 0 3
Automobiles 2510 0 1
Semiconductor Equipments and Products 4530 0 1
Telecommunications Services 5010 0 5
Technology Hardware & Equipment 4520 6.9 21
Diversified Financials 4020 8.7 24
Transportation 2030 10 3
Software & Services 4510 12.7 38
Capital Goods 2010 13.6 40
Hotel Restaurants & Leisure 2530 14.3 4
Real Estate 4040 15.8 14
Health Care Equipment & Supplies 3510 16.3 15
Materials 1510 16.7 16
Pharmaceuticals & Biotechnology 3520 17.5 17
Commercial Services & Supplies 2020 19.3 21
Consumer Durables & Apparel 2520 20 8
Media 2540 20 6
Retailing 2550 20.5 11
Food Beverage & Tobacco 3020 28.6 4
Insurance 4030 30 2
Household & Personal Products 3030 33.3 1
Banks 4010 43.8 3
Food & Staples Retailing 3010 100 1
TABLE A2
Notes: The table reports the average share of female directors (per industry), and the number of firms per industry. The
industry classification is based on the first four digits of the Global Industry Classification System (GICS).
Distribution of Female Directors, by Industry